David B. Lawrence

I study how law shapes the behavior of business organizations, with a particular focus on antitrust and the design of the public institutions that govern private power. Firms plan and act in response to market forces—shaped in part by antitrust law—and to legal obligations implemented through agencies and courts. But the law shapes corporate behavior only through its implementation by governing institutions: the courts, the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, state attorneys general, and the White House. I examine how those institutions guide business conduct and thus structure markets, and how they can do so more effectively.

I did this work for nearly fifteen years at the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, where I served most recently as Policy Director, reporting to Senate-confirmed leadership across administrations. I was the principal legal author of the 2023 Merger Guidelines and the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines, developed the doctrinal architecture of the United States’ monopolization cases against Google, Apple, Live Nation, and Visa, and oversaw the Division’s appeals and dispositive legal issues. On detail to the Federal Communications Commission, I led the interagency task force that reviewed the T-Mobile/Sprint transaction. Earlier, I clerked for Judge Wilfred Feinberg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Judge Richard J. Holwell of the Southern District of New York.

My scholarship pursues the same project, most recently in the N.Y.U. Law Review and the Antitrust Law Journal. I organize this work around three overlapping areas: (1) the substance of antitrust law; (2) the procedures and institutions that govern corporate conduct; and (3) the institutional design challenges and opportunities presented by new technologies.

I am prepared to teach Antitrust, Civil Procedure, Law and Technology, and Business Associations, with additional interests in AI and Law, Torts, and Administrative Law.

David B. Lawrence

Research

Working Papers

Antitrust in Time (job market paper) [SSRN] This article develops a framework to weigh tradeoffs between accuracy and speed in antitrust adjudication of ongoing conduct, introducing “temporal error costs” to account for the substantive costs of time to decision. Where the balance favors speed, it proposes that courts deploy underutilized statutory expedition authorities and case management tools to accelerate adjudication.

Publications

The Merger-Monopolization Gap, 101 N.Y.U. Law Review __ (forthcoming 2027) [SSRN] This article argues that Congress designed the Clayton Act as a monopolization-prevention tool but that enforcers have failed to execute on that vision. It proposes a doctrinal synthesis of Sherman and Clayton Act precedents, developing a four-part test to prevent monopolization-enabling mergers.
Agency Guidance After Slaughter: Administering Law Without Making It, Antitrust Law Journal (forthcoming) This essay examines the implications of the recent sea change in administrative law for the antitrust agencies’ practice of issuing informal guidance. It argues that past use of guidance by enforcers to create presumptions and safe harbors created administrative law risks that can be mitigated by incorporating direct reference to precedent when describing binding law.
Contemporary Merger Review Under the Rule of Law: Translating Old Law into Modern Economics, 2025 Columbia Business Law Review 99 [SSRN] This article examines the application of old precedents to modern merger review. It argues that sound law enforcement must both maintain absolute fidelity to binding precedent and reflect up-to-date economic understandings and market realities, which requires translation.
The 2023 Merger Guidelines: Lessons in the Importance of Incipiency, Modern Economics, and Monopsony (with Susan Athey), CPI Antitrust Chronicle (May 2024); Stanford Law & Economics Olin Working Paper No. 596 [SSRN] This piece elaborates on the legal and economic principles underlying the 2023 Merger Guidelines, arguing that the revised guidelines implemented long-overlooked doctrinal nuances in the standards of the Clayton Act, including as to the application of an incipiency standard and the treatment of mergers that harm workers and other input suppliers by creating monopsony.
Can Telecommunications Regulation Inform the Regulation of Generative AI?, Network Law Review (Winter 2024) [SSRN] This article leverages lessons from the history of telecommunications regulation to inform emerging regulatory approaches for generative AI.
Temperature-Responsive Semipermeable Capsules Composed of Colloidal Microgel Spheres (with T. Cai, Z. Hu, M. Marquez & A.D. Dinsmore), 23 Langmuir 395 (2007) [journal] First-authored article based on my undergraduate physics thesis, describing a novel nanoparticle self-assembly process; cited over 125 times in the soft condensed matter literature.

Lectures, Media, and Public Writing

Guest Essay, “This Is a Lot More Worrying Than the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Executive Power,” The New York Times (July 10, 2026)
“The Antitrust Implications of AI Systems,” The Lawfare Podcast (Oct. 15, 2024) [listen]
Panelist, roundtable discussion of the 2023 DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines, ABA Antitrust Magazine (Fall 2024) [transcript]
Interview, Enforcement Stories Series, ABA Antitrust Law Section [video]
Keynote Address, King’s College London Sixth Annual EU Competition Law Conference, “Transatlantic Convergence in Competition Enforcement” (Dec. 2024)
Keynote Address, William Howard Taft Lecture, New York State Bar Association & Columbia Business Law Review (Dec. 2024)
Keynote Address, Brigham Young University Law Conference, “Tech Platforms in a New Age of Competition Law” (Oct. 2022)

A full list of academic and government appearances is in my CV.

Contact

dbl230@nyu.edu  ·  SSRN  ·  LinkedIn  ·  CV (PDF)